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EXPANDING THE ROKN’S CAPABILITIES  
TO DEAL WITH THE SLBM THREAT FROM 
NORTH KOREA
 The navies of both Koreas are capable of conducting effective underwater op-erations� The North Korean navy possesses more than seventy submarines 
that, while aging and relatively obsolete, remain difficult to detect� They are 
tasked mainly with disrupting South Korean sea lines of communication� The 
Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy (ROKN) enjoys European technological support 
and coordinates its operational tactics with the United States; the ROKN belat-
edly has deployed advanced littoral patrol submarine forces against the threat of 
North Korean submarines�1
Although earlier tests, presumably from a Sinp’o-class ballistic-missile sub-
marine (SSB), were of debatable success, North Korea’s test firing on August 
24, 2016, of an indigenous submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM), the KN-11, from a larger 
submarine, seems to represent a milestone�2 This 
success has drawn greater attention to the balance 
of power between the two Korean navies�3
North Korea thus stands to become the sixth 
nation with SLBMs, joining the United States, the 
United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France� Such 
missiles provide a critical retaliatory (second-
strike) capability, which is an effective deterrent 
against preemptive (first-strike) attacks� Nev-
ertheless, serious doubts remain about the vi-
ability of North Korea’s prototype SLBM and SSB 
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technologies and the extent to which its land-based missile technologies can be 
adapted to SLBMs without further innovations� Regardless, this development 
certainly poses a new challenge for the ROKN; its ally, the U�S� Navy; and the 
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)� This challenge requires effective 
countermeasures using sea-based antiair and antimissile assets to enhance an-
tisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, as well as improved naval cooperation 
among the three navies to deter North Korean maritime threats, both conven-
tional and nuclear�
Unfortunately, few good countermeasures are available to the ROKN, and 
the situation is complicated by a heated debate between those who believe that 
North Korean deployment of a full-fledged and effective SLBM capability is 
imminent and those who are not convinced that the three test launches during 
2016 represent an urgent threat� In any case, it seems very likely that within a 
few years North Korea will deploy SSBs with some limited SLBM capacity� The 
ROKN needs to strengthen its readiness to respond to such North Korean missile 
and submarine threats, and must seek a way to secure strategic credibility for its 
deterrence posture�
This article considers the options open to the ROKN, in the context of its mar-
itime cooperation with the U�S� Navy, to deal with these intractable North Korean 
SLBM threats� What is the best approach to take, and what types of naval assets 
can reduce the strategic ramifications of North Korean deployment of SLBMs? 
The only feasible option appears to be for the ROKN to improve its submarine 
forces, placing greater reliance on subsurface forces to provide strategic deter-
rence� This should keep North Korean SSBs at bay without incurring excessive 
reactions from North Korea or other regional states�
NORTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT OF SLBMS:  
ANOTHER RISKY STRATEGY
North Korea seems determined to expand its nascent weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) capabilities to the maritime domain around the Korea Peninsula� 
This is the most opaque of all war-fighting domains, and North Korea is deploy-
ing its underwater assets with WMD capability against the United States and 
South Korea, and even against China, if recent speculations are to be believed�4 
For North Korea, operating any class of submarines—whether conventional or 
of a more modern type, and whether large or small—represents an attractive new 
asymmetric strategic option�5 This was proved by the sinking of the ROK ship 
(ROKS) Cheonan in 2010 by an indigenous North Korean midget submarine that 
launched a torpedo attack against the corvette in the West Sea (i�e�, the Yellow 
Sea)�6
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North Korea claims that on May 8, 2015, just off the coast of the Korea Pen-
insula in the East Sea (i�e�, the Sea of Japan), it successfully test fired an SLBM 
it calls Bukkeuksong-1�7 South Korean analyses, drawing on U�S� defense intelli-
gence agencies’ resources, indicate the missile was launched by a Sinp’o-class SSB, 
which are declared by North Korea’s Nodong Sinmun (Worker’s Paper) to be “stra-
tegic submarines�”8 These vessels are sixty-six to sixty-eight meters in length, with 
a beam of 6�6 meters� The large conning tower is fitted with a single vertically 
mounted tube� North Korea has had access to several types and classes of subma-
rines capable of operating as SSBs, through the use of either “Shaddock” tubes or 
a very large conning tower tube� These submarines were built by the Soviet Union 
at Komsomol’sk-na-Amure and Severodvinsk from 1958 until the mid-1960s 
(notably the Yankee/Golf classes) and by China at Dalian in 1964� The first Sinp’o- 
class SSB, a conventional ballistic-missile submarine, was built in November 2014 
at Sinp’o shipyard� There is also some evidence of preliminary SLBM testing at 
that time�9
North Korean deployment of submarines carrying one to two ballistic mis-
siles, each capable of delivering a miniaturized nuclear warhead, would be a 
very significant threat� Such vessels would be challenging to locate and track and 
would provide a mobile launch platform able to attack from any direction and at 
a significant distance from the Korea Peninsula� South Korean military analysts 
anticipate the North Korean navy will be ready to deploy a nine-meter SLBM 
with a range of two thousand kilometers within a few years�10
North Korea’s decision to develop an indigenous SLBM capacity appears to 
be an extension of its nuclear brinkmanship strategy�11 Acquiring a sea-based, 
second-strike nuclear option complements the nuclear weapons assumed to be 
deployed on land-based ballistic missiles� Two major motives underlie these poli-
cies: the North Korean regime is pursuing a blackmail strategy to demonstrate 
its “true nuclear power status,” hoping thereby to attract more attention from the 
United States and perhaps from China; and Kim Jong Un is trying to establish 
himself as North Korea’s absolute leader, building a personality cult to match 
those surrounding his father and grandfather�12
Kim has a two-pronged policy of simultaneous nuclear expansion and eco-
nomic development, known as the “byongjin policy,” but only the latter prong 
was declared a core political issue for the ruling North Korean Workers’ Party’s 
Seventh National People’s Congress, which was held in May 2016, following 
an unexplained thirty-seven-year hiatus�13 That Kim Jong Un’s rule is yet to be 
consolidated fully is shown by the top-to-bottom purges of political and military 
leaders since the execution of his uncle, Jang Song Tak, in December 2013� Kim 
Jong Un is hoping to use the development of SLBM capacity to demonstrate his 
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vision for a new era, differentiating him from his late father, Kim Jong Il� Kim 
wants to be seen as improving living standards for the North Korean people, 
but also as building a strong North Korean nation, to which end he is striving 
to make it a genuine and acknowledged nuclear power� In this way he hopes 
to put pressure on the international community, including China, and also to 
bolster his personal support through North Korean patriotism and anti-Western 
sentiments�
Kim deliberately has gotten directly involved with the new SLBM system and 
also with the new ship-to-ship missile known as the KN-01� The latter is likely a 
reverse-engineered version of the Russian SS-N-6, launchable from either Sinp’o-
class SSBs or surface platforms�14 According to the official (North) Korea Central 
News Agency (KCNA), Kim observed the test firing of the surface-launched 
antiship missile on February 7 and of the SLBM on May 8, 2015� These events 
were meant to be viewed as a dramatic success, especially in comparison with the 
satellite launch that occurred in December 2012�15 That launch was part of North 
Korea’s efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable 
of delivering a nuclear warhead to targets as far away as the continental United 
States� The ROKN and the U�S� Navy tracked the three-stage rocket from its boost 
phase to its midcourse phase over the Yellow Sea and recovered debris from the 
initial propulsion stage—to North Korea’s humiliation�16
The two-pronged policy of developing nuclear weapons and the country’s 
economy simultaneously seems likely to present grave problems for North Korea, 
which experienced a severe drought in 2014–15 and is likely to face a serious 
shortage of food and a variety of social problems� These will be exacerbated by a 
reduction in aid from China and probably Russia and by sanctions over nuclear 
and missile development by South Korea, the United States, and Japan� With the 
basic incompatibility of the two prongs becoming obvious, North Korea is seeking 
a way out of its dilemma by attempting to terrorize the United States and South 
Korea� This new threat, of a second-strike nuclear capability, represents a potent 
counter to the possibility of surgical military operations by the United States and 
to proactive tactics against North Korean military provocations by South Korea� 
Majority opinion perceives this scenario as a strategic nightmare, although some 
have argued that it actually stabilizes the situation, since North Korea no longer 
needs to rely on preemptive attack or a launch-on-warning policy�17
A further ratcheting up of tensions came on January 6, 2016, with a fourth 
North Korean nuclear test� KCNA claimed the test was of a hydrogen bomb, but 
this is generally disputed� On February 7, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth 
satellite launch via long-range ballistic missile�18 The private, U�S�-based research 
institute 38 North also has reported that the North Korean Sohae satellite launch-
ing station has been upgraded by construction of fuel-storage bunkers; it argues 
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that this indicates that the launch of a fifth North Korean long-range rocket, 
presumably another ICBM test, is upcoming�19
In summary, Pyongyang seems committed to grabbing the attention of Seoul, 
Washington, and Beijing by continuing to pursue a policy of nuclear blackmail to 
force their recognition of North Korea as a true nuclear power—which is central 
to Kim Jong Un’s consolidation of power�
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES FOR NORTH KOREA’S 
DEVELOPMENT OF SLBMS AND SSBS
The true extent of North Korean capabilities remains unclear, and observers’ 
skepticism abounds�20 Even in the absence of credible evidence that North Korea 
is capable of launching any SLBM, let alone a nuclear one, and from a true SSB, 
the apparent test firing of its first SLBM could be a game changer that disrupts 
the balance of naval power between the two Koreas�21 This view has dominated 
press coverage in South Korea�22 If North Korea’s new capability is confirmed, its 
sea-based nuclear-power status could strengthen significantly the strategic cred-
ibility of the country’s nuclear deterrence posture toward the United States and, 
by extension, toward South Korea�
For the near term, however, the SLBM test firing of May 2015 may well impose 
some strategic costs on Kim Jong Un’s regime� For instance, the North Korean 
pursuit of an SLBM capacity is in clear violation of four UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions condemning North Korea’s nuclear and missile proliferation: 
Resolution 1718 (2006), Resolution 1874 (2009), Resolution 2087 (2013), and 
Resolution 2094 (2013)�23 It also caused South Korean president Park Geun Hye 
to take a firmer line with the North, since her most significant diplomatic accom-
plishment was her strong working relationship with China, on the basis of which 
she offered the North the prospect of a “unification bonanza,” conditional on 
military restraint�24 President Park’s insistence was clear during the North-South 
dialogues held in November 2015: “Unless you demonstrate your commitment to 
denuclearization, you will get nothing from the South: you should be convinced 
of this fact�”25 President Park’s subtle diplomatic maneuvering, intended to influ-
ence China’s attitude toward the two Koreas, can be seen in her courageous par-
ticipation in the 2015 China Victory Day Parade, a distinctly military occasion, 
despite strong objections from Washington and Tokyo�26
Indeed, following the latest round of sanctions imposed by UNSC Resolution 
2270 following North Korea’s January 6, 2016, fourth nuclear test, President Park 
insisted that the North abandon its nuclear ambitions entirely: “[D]espite North 
Korea’s continuous saber rattling through nuclear and missile tests and its defi-
ance of UNSC resolutions, any future provocations will be met with robust retri-
bution�”27 The security situation on the Korea Peninsula has deteriorated further 
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since the latest sanctions, with North Korea repeatedly firing short- and medium-
range missiles and also broadcasting video mock-ups of military landings and 
preemptive drills targeting South Korea’s capital and U�S� cities�28 Meanwhile, U�S� 
president Barack Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” has given North Korea 
scant room to maneuver, despite the United States becoming more accommo-
dating toward Cuba and Iran� More seriously, from Kim Jong Un’s perspective, 
China has become a less reliable ally for North Korea, with ideological ties being 
given less weight than before�29
Various commercial satellite images indicate, and some military and private 
intelligence agencies monitoring North Korean SLBM and SSB development sug-
gest, that the North Koreans are encountering some serious technical difficulties: 
they are using liquid propellant rather than the superior solid variety, as shown 
by a distinct lack of white smoke in images; and there are problems with the con-
densed air propulsion to eject the SLBM above the water’s surface, as evidenced 
by the use of a vertical launch tube to push the missile out of the conning tower� 
Further problems arise from the need to adapt to the length and beam of the 
available SSBs, which are rather too small to accommodate the SLBMs’ “plug-in/
plug-out” design� North Korea’s SSB is apparently the product of reverse engi-
neering 1970s vessels built by Russia and China�30 The London-based IHS Jane’s 
Defence Weekly analyzes the North Korean KN-11 SLBM as being similar to the 
Soviet R-27 Zyb / SS-N-6 Serb SLBM; North Korea is known to have acquired 
some of these missiles in 2003�31
It also has been reported that on November 28 and December 12, 2015, at-
tempted follow-on test firings of KN-11 SLBMs from Sinp’o-class SSBs resulted 
in failure, so perhaps North Korea’s Sinp’o-class SSB will remain nothing more 
than an impractical prototype, similar to those of Russia and China during the 
1960s�32 Furthermore, even if SLBMs can be launched reliably, a great deal more 
would be involved before the North Koreans could establish a submarine-based 
second-strike nuclear attack capability, and they are very far from achieving the 
operational capabilities and technological innovations required for the continu-
ous at-sea deterrent nuclear capability that other powers maintain� Indeed, South 
Korean analyses suggest that North Korea may acquire just a single prototype of 
the Sinp’o-class SSB, with a single vertical launch tube for SLBMs�33
In summation, U�S�-ROK combined military intelligence agency analyses 
conclude that this submarine was built at the Sinp’o shipyard, on the basis of 
1960s technologies, by reverse engineering Golf-class SSBs acquired from the 
Soviet Union; that it can carry a maximum of three KN-11 SLBMs; and that it 
would be incapable of operating as a far-sea strategic nuclear deterrent without 
significantly enhanced far-sea command-and-control systems and capacities�34 
Russia and China have preferred to deploy their SSBs and SSBNs in a near-sea 
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environment—the so-called bastion strategy, whereby nations with a continen-
tally oriented naval strategy, lacking sufficient deep-sea control, seek to maximize 
the chances of operating an effective second-strike capability�35 It therefore seems 
impossible that North Korea could deploy its SSBs for far-sea strategic-deterrent 
patrol operations, since this would require surface combatant task units centered 
on aircraft carriers�
Even if North Korea succeeds in building indigenous SSBs by copying Russian 
and Chinese models, ejecting an SLBM from a vertical launch tube through the 
large conning tower of the Sinp’o-class SSB remains a formidable challenge� The 
Washington Free Beacon, an online news site, reported on December 10, 2015, 
that a Sinp’o-class SSB had been damaged after it failed to eject a KN-11 SLBM 
(or perhaps a submarine-launched cruise missile [SLCM]) properly off the coast 
of Wonsan in North Korea�36 If this U�S�-originating report is correct, the failure 
represents a serious setback for North Korea’s SLBM and SSB program�37
Those with a skeptical view of North Korea’s progress can point to the small 
size of the Sinp’o-class SSB, which seems inadequate for SLBM launching� A 
South Korean think tank has argued that the SLBM test firing was completely 
fabricated to support Kim Jong Un’s pretensions to lead a true nuclear power and 
to bolster the personality cult of the Kim family�38 Since the KN-11 SLBM’s length 
is nine meters, the Sinp’o-class SSB’s length appears too small, unless North Korea 
has redesigned the submarine; and since the KN-11 SLBM has a range of less than 
two thousand kilometers, the Sinp’o-class SSB is not capable of carrying out an 
attack on the continental United States, for which a much larger vessel (of more 
than three thousand tons) would be required�39 Moreover, analysis of the recov-
ered debris from the first stages of North Korean rockets launched in December 
2012 and February 2016 has revealed that North Korea lacks the materials and 
the fabrication skills that other navies with SLBM capability employ�40 China’s 
Global Times revealed that, surprisingly, the main body of the KN-11 SLBM ap-
pears to be made of reinforced glass fiber rather than the carbon fiber usual for 
modern, advanced missiles�41 Chinese military analysts also have argued that 
North Korea appears to lack confidence in its preliminary SLBM trials: appar-
ently it conducted ejection tests using a stationary submersible platform�42
Such doubts about North Korean capabilities have been partially resolved by 
photographs and video footage released by KCNA of the three launches on April 
23, July 9, and August 24, 2016�43 One day after the latest test, North Korea’s 
state-run website Uriminzokkiri claimed a fully successful flight test of an SLBM 
following the earlier ejection tests� The missile was fired at a very steep angle 
and flew about five hundred kilometers (311 miles) toward Japan, falling into 
the East Sea within Japan’s air defense identification zone; had it been fired at a 
shallower angle, it could have flown more than a thousand kilometers� The U�S� 
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and South Korean militaries report that the 2016 tests were probably powered 
by solid rather than liquid propellant, and also confirm that they were launched 
from below the surface of the water, presumably by compressed gas, judging by 
the narrow translucent exhaust plumes; this cold-launch technology represents 
a significant milestone� Some video images of the loading and launch appear to 
show a larger submarine than the Sinp’o-class SSB used for the previous tests;44 
it seems that this latest test was conducted from a new type of SSB, of the Gorae 
class (after the Korean word for dolphin), displacing approximately two thou-
sand tons and equipped with a vertical launch tube�45 Both the Sinp’o and Gorae 
classes have limited endurance and missile-carrying capabilities, however, and 
South Korean analysts have speculated that the Gorae class is an experimental 
prototype intended to pave the way for larger SSBs with better endurance, which 
may well be nuclear powered�46
This demonstration of several important SLBM technologies, including un-
derwater ejection and initial attitude control and an improved underwater plat-
form, lends weight to the fear that North Korean SLBM capabilities could mature 
much more quickly than previously believed�
IMPLICATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN SLBMS FOR SOUTH KOREA 
AND ITS NEIGHBORS
There are two distinct schools of thought about the viability of North Korea’s ca-
pacity to operate its KN-11 SLBM system� Opinions differ on the progress North 
Korea has made toward the miniaturization of nuclear warheads for long-range 
delivery, the authenticity of its SLBM test firings, and the feasibility of deploying 
full-fledged SSBs in the East Sea�
The Optimists
Some see little immediate cause for concern, arguing that North Korea’s missile-
related technologies and systems for submarine-launched and long-range missile 
strikes are insufficient�47 They also cite its lack of far-seas operational experience 
and proficiency, the inadequacy of Russian and Chinese Golf-class SSBs, and 
the weakness of the Sinp’o naval base where the SSBs are constructed—satellite 
imagery shows the base has a simple flat-top design, in contrast to the complex 
zigzag features of Russian and Chinese naval bases, implying a lack of sophisti-
cation in the comparable Sinp’o facilities� Rumors abound that during the mid-
1990s North Korea purchased Chinese and Russian Golf-class SSBs as scrap, 
using them as the Chinese navy did in developing its first-ever aircraft carrier 
in 1997 from a Russian vessel�48 Such views mainly come from U�S� and South 
Korean defense experts, who believe that North Korea would need considerable 
time and effort before it could deploy SSBs with SLBM capability to conduct true 
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strategic-deterrence patrol missions, and that doing so would require clandestine 
technical support from both China and Russia�49
The Pessimists
In contrast, many serving and former naval officers are very worried about North 
Korean progress in operating SSBs with SLBM capabilities� They cite North 
Korea’s secretive technological collaboration with China and Russia on ballistic 
missiles and submarines; its long experience in developing land-based, three-
stage ballistic missiles under the pretext of launching commercial satellites; and 
the many circumstantial indications that it has miniaturized its nuclear warheads 
successfully� The recent ceremonial military parade in Pyongyang provided es-
pecially noteworthy evidence:50 display of a modified version of the liquid-fueled 
KN-08 ICBM, apparently with a small nuclear warhead� The KN-11 SLBM ap-
pears to be a new version of the KN-08�51 These naval officers also mention re-
curring evidence of land-based tests of a submarine ejector system using vertical 
launch tubes, conducted at an island off Sinp’o�
Common Concerns: South Korea, Its Neighbors, and Its Allies
Both sides agree, however, that the North Korean test firing used an SLBM, not 
an SLCM; that problems remain with miniaturizing nuclear warheads and with 
developing missile-ejection technology; and that North Korea intends to acquire 
SLBM capability with WMD warheads, whatever the costs and consequences� It 
is therefore just a matter of time before North Korea deploys indigenous KN-11 
SLBMs in Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs� However, in addition to this SLBM threat, 
some South Korean naval and security experts argue that North Korea may 
be able to develop SLCMs as well� In October 2015, the Russian Project 636�3 
Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine (SSK) Rostov-na-Donu fired multiple Kalibr 
(3M-14) SLCMs through its torpedo tubes, from the Caspian Sea into Syria’s Ar 
Raqqah province� Many lesser naval powers have acquired Kilo submarines, and 
North Korea may be intending to make use of the Russian SLCM experience and 
technologies�52 Kalibr SLCMs carry a five-hundred-kilogram warhead, have a 
range of two thousand kilometers, and are accurate within a few meters�53
The two sides differ on the timescale of when North Korea will be able to de-
ploy indigenous SLBMs carried by Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs, with the pessimists 
anticipating sometime in 2017 as the earliest this might occur�54 If such views 
prove correct, this would be a grave concern for South Korea and other countries 
in the region, as well as for the United States�55 Military experts and security 
analysts from both sides of this debate, in Seoul and in Washington, were caught 
out by North Korea’s development of an SLBM capability, which further increases 
the threat its weapons of mass destruction pose�56 It is certainly true that missiles 
launched from underwater assets are more difficult to detect and intercept than 
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land-based ones, and as North Korea’s SLBM capabilities expand into the deep 
seas this problem will become more serious, threatening South Korea, Japan, 
and U�S� bases in Northeast Asia, and also complicating U�S�-led theater missile-
defense planning� The wider regional character of North Korea’s agenda is clear 
to the military establishments in Seoul and Washington�57
These developments also affect South Korean plans for an indigenous missile-
defense system intended to guard against potential missile attacks from both 
China and North Korea�58 South Korea’s National Security Committee considers 
that North Korean SSBs carrying land-attack missiles would complicate regional 
missile-defense planning seriously, since the system under development and due 
for completion by 2020, known as the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), 
only targets North Korean aircraft�59 Therefore the ROK Ministry of National De-
fense (MND) is attempting to change the conceptual framework of KAMD from 
a proactive defense posture to a preemptive one� North Korean SLBMs would be 
targeted in ports capable of harboring SSBs�
Accomplishing this likely would require U�S� cooperation to enhance KAMD’s 
competency� Moreover, bilateral negotiations are taking place between the U�S� 
Department of Defense and the ROK MND about deploying the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on South Korean soil, although the U�S� 
Army would operate it; however, the results of the recent election in South Korea 
have cast doubt on the political feasibility of this deployment�60 The Japanese 
defense minister also recently referred to this issue publicly for the first time, in 
the context of protecting Japanese and U�S� forces in Japan�61 On June 28, 2016, 
the U�S� Navy, the JMSDF, and the ROKN conducted their first joint missile-
tracking naval exercise, code-named PACIFIC DRAGON, off the coast of Hawaii, 
on the sidelines of the Rim of the Pacific exercise (known as RIMPAC)� PACIFIC 
DRAGON focused on improving tactical and technical coordination among the 
three navies� It included live ballistic target tracking, with each navy’s Aegis 
ballistic-missile defense (BMD) system sharing tactical data�62
North Korea and China
Even China has expressed serious concerns about North Korea’s third SLBM 
launch, on August 24, 2016, and its fifth nuclear test, on September 9, 2016, 
and has criticized North Korea’s claim to be a nuclear-armed state�63 In light of 
the WMD threats from North Korea, Chinese president Xi Jinping’s ambitious 
but ambiguous “True Maritime Power” initiative may be impacted, with China’s 
neighbors wondering who is responsible for North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy 
and perhaps also having second thoughts about participating in China’s “One 
Belt, One Road” initiative, given the prospect of wider geopolitical fallout�64 
North Korea also fears President Xi’s ambitious plans to establish a “New Type of 
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Great-Power Relations” with the United States� China is distracted further by ter-
ritorial disputes in the East and South China Seas� Indeed, there is some evidence 
of a shift in Chinese policy toward North Korea, especially China’s collaboration 
with the United States and Japan to pass stricter sanctions, via UNSC Resolu-
tion 2270, in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM tests in January and 
February 2016�65 Despite Xi Jinping’s apparent endorsement of Kim Jong Un in a 
formal letter in October 2015, the Chinese are surely aware of the geopolitical and 
strategic implications of North Korea’s latest nuclear test, on September 9, 2016�66
The growing disharmony between China and North Korea has been manifest 
even in the dimension of popular culture: a five-day Chinese tour by the all-
female North Korean musical group Moranbong in December 2015 was called 
off suddenly—just three hours before the first performance� Sources from the 
Chinese Communist Party attributed this to “communication issues at the work-
ing level” with the North Korean Workers’ Party, although it is rumored that this 
debacle may have been China’s response to Kim Jong Un’s hints about developing 
a hydrogen bomb�67
In general, China seems less inclined to provide the political and economic 
commitment that North Korea desires; yet Chinese supplies of cash, food, arms, 
and energy remain crucial for North Korea� With China proving less tractable, it 
is no longer unreasonable to suppose that an impoverished North Korea may be 
trying to exert pressure on Beijing, as well as on Washington and Tokyo� Hence 
the continued nuclear brinkmanship as a strategy intended to overcome such 
external difficulties�68
Yet, although the Chinese are scrambling to avoid being blamed for North Ko-
rea’s disruptive behavior, they are unlikely to go beyond the stern words already 
uttered; it probably will be business as usual, with China doing the minimum to 
ensure North Korean survival and to avoid the threat of North Korean collapse, 
which for China would be an even worse outcome than the status quo�
A Chinese monthly magazine dealing with naval matters has referred openly 
to the fact that China considers the proliferation of various types of submarine 
operations in the East Sea to be a serious problem� China is concerned that North 
Korea could create sanctuaries within the East Sea where its low-value SLBM 
submarines could operate within a “bastion,” emulating the classic Soviet and 
Chinese strategy�69 China is worried that this would convert the East Sea into an 
operational theater for Western submarines, disrupting Chinese plans to use it 
as a sea route for supplying bituminous coal from three poor northern Chinese 
provinces to the country’s prosperous eastern cities� Another problem for China 
is that North Korean SLBMs might prompt the ROK to set aside its long-standing 
complaints about Japan’s historical transgressions to forge a closer trilateral 
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military alliance with Japan and the United States—something China has worked 
hard to prevent�70
China doubts the plausibility of North Korea’s modification of the Sinp’o/
Gorae-class SSB to carry and launch its indigenous ballistic missiles� But, beyond 
the possibility of North Korea actually operating SLBMs, China seems upset by 
North Korean grandstanding in the East Sea in general�71 The Chinese under-
stand that SLBM submarines would need extensive protection from other naval 
forces to respond rapidly to hostile forces seeking to restrain the SLBM subma-
rines in confined seas� The prospect of a North Korean deployment of Sinp’o/
Gorae-class SSBs in the East Sea drawing more attention from the ASW forces 
of the ROKN, the U�S� Navy, and the JMSDF is most unwelcome to the Chinese 
military, especially if such scrutiny extends into the West Sea—a very sensitive 
area for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, which bases its North Sea 
Fleet at Qingdao�72
Although North Korea’s rhetoric remains focused on the United States, alarm 
bells are beginning to ring for China as North Korean WMD threats become 
reality�
The KN-11 SLBM clearly represents an advance toward building a genuine 
SLBM capability, one that North Korea is intent on developing� Recently North 
Korea implicitly claimed a successful test (though not a flight test) of a new 
ICBM engine that would enable it to strike the North American continent with 
a miniaturized nuclear warhead� Several steps remain before North Korea could 
realize its ICBM aspirations, but there have been indications of some progress in 
miniaturizing nuclear warheads; in testing reentry technology to allow an ICBM 
to return through Earth’s atmosphere without breaking up; and in building a 
solid-fuel rocket engine, which expedites launch preparation�73 North Korea has 
vowed to expand its nuclear and missile programs in defiance of the latest round 
of tougher UNSC sanctions imposed in March 2016�
It would be a serious mistake for the United States to overlook the gravity of 
the nuclear threat that North Korea represents; this issue will remain near the top 
of the U�S� national security agenda�74
THE ROKN’S REQUIREMENTS OF OPERATION: A PREEMPTIVE 
ANTI-EXIT STRATEGY
If the worst-case scenario materializes—North Korea technically and operation-
ally perfects its SLBM capabilities and miniaturizes its nuclear warheads for long-
range delivery (it is believed to have stockpiled six to eight nuclear warheads)—
the ROKN certainly will need to carry out a wholesale revision of its concepts of 
naval warfare�75 It should continue to deter North Korean maritime subsurface 
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threats through its existing littoral ASW and antiair warfare (AAW) approaches, 
but also must develop new capabilities for submarine deterrence patrols and anti-
exit operations, as well as intensive air and surface ASW operations, sea-based 
special operations, theater missile defense, and enhanced antisurface warfare 
(ASUW)�
It has been reported that after observing the North Korean SLBM test firing, 
President Park Geun Hye immediately ordered the ROK MND to develop ap-
propriate preemptive measures, focusing especially on sophisticated underwater 
assets and indigenous air- and missile-defense capabilities�76 The initial emphasis 
is on countering North Korean SLBM threats through an innovative military 
doctrine, called the “4D military posture” for defend, detect, disrupt, and destroy�77
But it is also essential to establish new operational countermeasures� While the 
operational abilities of North Korean SLBMs remain unproven and the specifica-
tions of the Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs are still mysterious, the ROKN should deter 
North Korean submarine and WMD threats by a well-defined preemptive anti-
exit strategy that entails sustainable long-duration submarine operations beyond 
the South Korean area of operations (AOR)� To accomplish this, the ROK MND 
is planning an “underwater KAMD system�” Detection will employ military-
intelligence surveillance satellites and strategic, high-altitude, unmanned aerial 
vehicles to monitor North Korean Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs berthed at their naval 
base; tracking will be done by dispatching Aegis-equipped ROKN destroyers and 
frigates to the scene; and destruction will rely on intercepting SLBMs with antiair 
missiles such as SM-2s launched from surface combatant ships�78
The ROK MND recently published a five-year defense improvement plan, 
which proposes supplementing the limited ability of the current Aegis air-defense 
system by developing an indigenous theater ballistic-missile defense function or 
an air/missile defense capability�79 The ROKN is known to have wanted to imple-
ment a limited sea-based BMD system for the existing Aegis-equipped KDX-
III destroyers with the SM-6 missiles under development, but this BMD was 
considered inadequate for the ROKN’s long-term requirements, and the project 
was derailed by political difficulties during the liberal administration of the late 
president Roh Moo Hyun� The ROKN’s next three King Sejong the Great–class 
KDX-IIIs will be equipped with the Aegis Baseline 9 naval combat system that 
features an integrated air- and missile-defense capability, including Lockheed 
Martin’s SPY-1 multifunctional radar system� The ships will be constructed by 
South Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries and are expected to come 
into service in 2020, 2021, and 2022�80
Both the SM-6 and the SM-3 were developed for the U�S� Navy for either 
land- or sea-based missile defense� The SM-6 has only a limited capability as a 
missile interceptor, so the U�S� Navy relies primarily on the SM-3; but this is a 
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very expensive option for intercepting North Korean ICBMs, especially when 
the latters’ ability to carry nuclear warheads is still in doubt�81 The U�S� Navy 
and the JMSDF collaborated on the development and deployment of the SM-3, 
but the ROKN so far has not used this missile on its King Sejong the Great–class 
KDX-III destroyers� Having chosen to stay outside the U�S�-led BMD architecture 
intended to counter regional WMD threats, the ROK is faced with a difficult 
decision� The indigenous KAMD system, even if bolstered by U�S� assistance, 
will offer only a brief window of defense against the short-range ballistic missile 
threat from North Korea, and both the ROK and its ally, the United States, remain 
in the crosshairs of North Korean SLBMs� ROKN acquisition of SM-3s to counter 
such WMD threats is not an absurd idea, but it would be extremely expensive to 
accomplish�82
North Korea’s SLBM aspirations have provoked operational and tactical tur-
moil in the ROKN� If it is not feasible to acquire SM-3s or SM-6s to function as 
interceptors as part of an underwater KAMD system, there is an urgent need to 
enhance far-seas ASW operational capability� The ROKN still is operating its 
obsolete P-3C Orions for littoral ASW missions, and has yet to secure defense 
budget allocations to acquire replacements� Many naval experts have proposed 
acquiring P-8 Poseidon far-seas maritime security surveillance aircraft to sup-
port the ROKN’s underwater KAMD system and to enhance its ASW operational 
capabilities�83 The Poseidon is the world’s most capable maritime patrol aircraft, 
with a state-of-the-art networked ASW system; next-generation sensors, such as 
fourth-level, low-frequency, active sonar; and reliable, high-efficiency turbofan 
engines� ROKN acquisition of the P-8 would allow greater interoperability with 
the U�S� Navy and the JMSDF, which are already operating these aircraft through-
out the Indo-Asian-Pacific region, and would enhance greatly the ROKN’s ASW 
abilities to detect North Korean underwater assets�84
It is essential for the ROKN to establish a robust and rigorous new concept 
of submarine-based ASW to exploit the technical and functional vulnerabilities 
of the North Korean SLBMs and SSBs so as to contain them within the bay of 
Sinp’o� This will require two major operational changes: increasing the capacity 
for preemptive submarine operations and extending the operational areas be-
yond their present limits� Despite the ROKN’s substantial experience with ASW 
in its East Sea AOR, it will not be an easy task to detect SSBs in such a cluttered 
and noisy body of water and then to destroy them in the face of North Korean 
antisubmarine operations�
Conducting preemptive anti-exit strikes on North Korean naval bases under 
the concept of the underwater KAMD doctrine will require changes to several 
aspects of current South Korean practice: expanding the AORs, revising rules 
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of engagement (ROEs), and deploying ROKN submarine forces in the near 
sea around the Sinp’o naval facility� Under the current rather basic guidelines 
of defense-oriented ROEs, which regulate how to fight against North Korean 
military provocations, the ROKN would have very limited options in deploying 
its far-seas ASW assets to deter North Korean SLBMs preemptively beyond the 
existing AOR� Open publications from the ROKN and ROK MND explicitly 
mention how the ROKN AORs are limited by the northern limit line (NLL) and 
indicate that this prevents the ROKN from conducting an effective preemptive 
anti-exit strategy�85
In this regard, urgent negotiations with the United States also are needed to 
implement a conditional wartime transfer of operational control to the ROKN� 
One of the top priorities of an ROK-led wartime operational plan is the expan-
sion of the ROK’s AORs to deter North Korean WMD threats that currently are 
being allowed to develop in the shelter of the NLL and the Demilitarized Zone� 
Relatively silent SSBs with a low acoustic signature provide very little indication 
of their presence and can launch SLBMs without warning� In the complex and 
noisy underwater domain of the East Sea, such vessels, once submerged in deep 
seas, are very hard to detect, presenting a serious challenge to South Korea’s na-
tional security�86
The ROKN therefore needs to move beyond its current littoral ASW opera-
tions, mostly conducted by surface combatant platforms in the existing limited 
AOR� Two constraints severely hamper these operations: the armistice agreement 
between the North Korean military and the UN Command, and the prevailing 
operational plans under the guidelines of the ROK-U�S� Combined Forces Com-
mand, established in 1978� Under the current defense-oriented naval doctrine, 
the ROKN is exercising only very limited littoral ASW capabilities, targeting 
the aging North Korean Romeo-class submarines and midget submarines� All 
ROKN platforms operate within the currently designated AORs: the East Sea, 
and south of the NLL in the West Sea� The emerging threat from North Korean 
Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs makes an early expansion of the limited South Korean 
AORs essential�
Under the current implementation of the ROEs, according to the armistice 
agreement, the ROKN can deploy no preemptive assets into North Korean wa-
ters, so it is not possible to deploy submarine forces to detect North Korean SSBs 
or to conduct comprehensive far-seas ASW operations against North Korean SSB 
patrols�87 To meet the newly formulated ROK MND 4D military doctrine, the 
ROKN’s operational capacity in the East Sea needs to be expanded significantly 
within the next few years�88 Preemptive anti-exit operations in the underwater 
domain will require larger underwater assets capable of sustaining long-duration 
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   63 2/22/17   9:32 AM
15
Yoon: Expanding the ROKN's Capabilities to Deal with the SLBM Threat fr
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 6 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
missions�89 The 4D military posture also will require technological advances to 
detect, track, and attack the Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs in today’s increasingly clut-
tered and noisy maritime environment�90
The ROKN has concentrated mainly on AAW and ASUW, with littoral ASW 
capabilities being essentially self-defensive� The kinds of mission so far prioritized 
are represented by the ROKN’s acquisition of Gwanggaeto the Great–class KDX-I, 
KDX-II (a�k�a� Yi Sun Shin–class KDX-II), and KDX-III (a�k�a� King Sejong the 
Great–class KDX-III) destroyers; Ulsan-class FFX frigates; and Chang Bogo–
class KSS-I and KSS-II (a�k�a� Sohn Won Il–class KSS-II) submarines�91 With the 
advent of North Korean SSBs, however, surface vessels are clearly vulnerable to 
attack unless the ROKN has the resources to conduct intensive ASW operations� 
The ROKN is operating an organic ASW air asset, the P-3C Orion, and would 
benefit greatly from establishing an underwater sound-tracking system in the 
sensitive seas by integrating the ASW resources of friendly navies� In addition, 
with the prospect of a near-term North Korean deployment of its SSBs carrying 
SLBMs in deep-sea domains of the East Sea, the most opaque of all war-fighting 
theaters, the ROKN is urging more sustained development of its underwater fire-
power with better and more capable sensors and weapons�92 Its next-generation 
submarines, the Chang Bogo–class KSS-IIIs, and the Gwanggaeto-class KDX-III 
destroyers are expected to have a long-range, land-strike capability, using indig-
enous long-range cruise missiles, code-named Haesong-III, with a range of more 
than a thousand kilometers�93
ROKN OPTIONS
How can the ROKN implement a preemptive anti-exit strategy in the under-
water domains to counter North Korea’s SLBM-oriented nuclear brinkmanship 
strategy? It needs to acquire strategic ASW platforms to facilitate comprehensive 
ASW operations and enhance its ability to contribute to joint or combined ASW 
operations with the U�S� Navy and the JMSDF� This will send a strong signal to 
North Korea that its plan to operate its SLBM submarines by emulating the Soviet 
or Chinese bastion strategy will be riskier than expected� The essential require-
ment is to bottle up North Korean SLBM submarines and hunt them down in 
confined waters, thus effectively countering the North Korean bastion strategy�94
As to the specifics, there are several options for the ROKN to enhance its 
comprehensive ASW capabilities: purchase P-8s, build an ASW-oriented aircraft 
carrier (CV), or build nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)�95
Submarines
Some important work is already in progress: the ROKN’s submarine force com-
mand, established in mid-2015, has demonstrated its effectiveness quickly; and 
on January 4, 2016, the ROKN set up a task force to design and configure the first 
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batch of Chang Bogo–class KSS-III submarines� The project’s defense industrial 
partner is Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, which has demonstrated 
its capacity for first-in-class construction with the Chang Bogo–class KSS-I/II, 
with the KSS-I being constructed under license and the KSS-II using indigenous 
technologies and designs�
Unofficial sources contacted by the Seoul Broadcasting System have revealed 
that a decision on the propulsion system for the second and third batches of the 
Chang Bogo–class KSS-III submarines has yet to be made� It seems not unlikely, 
then, that the air-independent propulsion mode of the first batch may be replaced 
by an indigenous nuclear propulsion system for the subsequent batches�96 It also 
has been reported that the ROKN plans to build a total of nine Chang Bogo–class 
KSS-III submarines between 2027 and 2043; these will have a three-thousand-
ton displacement and be equipped with vertical missile launchers�97 The Sohn 
Won Il Forum (the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy mechanism for discuss-
ing maritime security issues) has recommended that the subsequent batches be 
capable of long-endurance underwater operations (preferably 50 percent longer 
than Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSBs), high speed, and improved maneuverability at 
various depths in the complex underwater spaces around the Korea Peninsula�98 
Nuclear power plants using highly enriched uranium fuel may be the best option, 
although they would be limited to less than 20 percent enrichment to meet the 
ROK-U�S� nuclear agreement signed when the ROK abandoned its secret nuclear 
weapons program during the 1970s�99
Carriers
The ROKN has been negotiating with the ROK MND and joint chiefs of staff 
about acquiring a next-generation Dokdo-class batch 2 landing helicopter dock 
(LHD)� An ASW-oriented aircraft carrier would be invaluable for integrat-
ing a wide variety of naval component operations in the open seas, including 
comprehensive ASW operations in the surface, air, and underwater domains to 
counter the proliferation of conventionally powered quiet submarines capable of 
extended submerged operation�100
An ASW-oriented CV of this kind would provide the ROKN with many ben-
efits: advanced, long-range, underwater, high-/low-frequency sound sensors; air 
and surface tactical ASW data integration at the theater level; close operational 
coordination by a dedicated shipborne ASW commander; and active ASW weap-
ons, including heavy torpedoes� An ASW CV, by providing firm sea control, also 
would provide the SSNs already discussed with greater survivability and sustain-
ability in conducting long-duration, deep-sea deterrent patrols� A very capable 
ASW CV thus would be able to implement the necessary preemptive anti-exit 
strategy� Such a highly integrated surface platform could deliver far-seas ASW 
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functionality beyond the current AORs and adopt more-active ROEs to detect, 
identify, and attack North Korean SSBs�
In addition to ASW, the ROKN CV could coordinate many related functions: 
dispatching special operations forces; using attached submerged vehicles; and 
launching long-range, land-attack cruise missiles�
Choices, Combinations, and Collaboration
Nuclear-powered submarines can operate in deep waters, and can both chase en-
emy submarines and elude torpedo attacks on themselves� Fast and stealthy SSNs 
are an offensive asset, capable of conducting submarine-to-submarine operations 
and land-attack warfare� South Korean SSNs could prevent North Korean SLBM 
submarines from operating in distant seas, obliging them to stay close to shore� 
Whether the ROKN will be able to build an indigenous ASW CV or SSNs or both 
in the near future is uncertain; but, if it becomes necessary to choose among ASW 
assets, SSNs are probably the best option�
In addition to the capabilities mentioned above, SSNs can detect unknown 
submarines acoustically, but this is not easy; only an ASW-oriented naval task 
force will be able to conduct effective ASW operations in the complicated un-
derwater environment around the Korea Peninsula, in which sound distortion is 
commonplace� Even with SSNs, the ROKN’s offensive capabilities would remain 
very limited, so ROKN SSNs would have to be capable of supporting a USN CV 
strike group, which would include assets able to project power inland from the 
littoral, such as a USN Zumwalt-class destroyer designed for land-attack mis-
sions� The ROKN still would lack underwater assets for far-seas operations�101
What models are available for an ROKN ASW CV? The Royal Australian 
Navy’s Canberra-class LHD is an interesting example� Austal USA produced 
a trimaran littoral combat ship for the U�S� Navy, and the same company has 
suggested a trimaran CV capable of carrying many unmanned aerial combat ve-
hicles�102 If North Korea succeeds in deploying a submarine force with an SLBM 
capacity, a CV-based organic ASW air wing capacity would provide an effective 
deterrent� An ROKN ASW CV should not be regarded primarily as an offensive 
naval platform, but essentially as a defensive asset intended to deny access to any 
potential adversaries’ underwater assets in the near seas of the Korea Peninsula�
Another issue concerns U�S� plans to redeploy more than 60 percent of its na-
val combatants to Asia by 2020� According to the recently revised “Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” now subtitled “Forward, Engaged, Ready,” 
the U�S� Navy’s current and upcoming budget submissions will provide for a fleet 
of more than three hundred ships and a forward presence of about 120 ships 
by 2020, the latter up from an average of ninety-seven in 2014� The strategy in-
cludes a statement that “[t]he centerpieces of naval capability remain the Carrier 
Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group� � � � These ships, aircraft, Sailors, 
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and Marines have deterred and defeated aggression since World War II and will 
continue to do so well into the future�”103 However, as China seeks to become a 
true maritime power and disputes in the East and South China Seas grow hotter, 
the U�S� Seventh Fleet may be drawn away from Korean waters in the near future�
Therefore the ROKN may have to take responsibility for preserving maritime 
security around the Korea Peninsula and for handling North Korean maritime 
threats� An ASW CV and SSNs would be immensely helpful for fulfilling this 
enhanced role� USN cruisers and destroyers assigned to monitor, track, and 
intercept North Korean WMD threats currently have insufficient air wing ASW 
assets and underwater platforms to conduct effective ASW operations, so it is 
only sensible for the ROKN to provide complementarity� The ROKN needs hy-
brid assets capable of both defensive and offensive naval operations� By building 
an indigenous ASW CV and SSNs, the ROKN can satisfy both strategic aims in 
a rapidly changing maritime security environment that presents several pressing 
challenges�
This article has summarized the political and operational contexts within which 
North Korea’s latest acts of nuclear blackmail—its flight test of an SLBM on 
August 24, 2016, and its fifth nuclear test, on September 9, 2016—should be 
understood� Its analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSB has 
been based on official South Korean (especially MND), U�S�, and other sources, 
including from the United Kingdom and China�
The results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough 
evidence available at present either to confirm or to refute the existence of a 
functional North Korean SLBM and SSB� North Korea’s claims about its SLBMs 
are undermined by news of several apparently unsuccessful earlier test firings� 
Even accepting North Korea’s claims about its SLBMs at face value, there is little 
proof that North Korea has succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warheads, 
so the most extravagant fears are not justified� Nevertheless, the North Korean 
determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly, as evidenced 
by the building of a new and larger SSB and the successful flight test of a solid-
propellant SLBM�104
Taken together with North Korea’s announcement of a supposed test of a 
hydrogen bomb on January 6 and of an ICBM on February 7, 2016, the KN-11 
SLBM claims probably should be seen primarily as part of an effort to establish 
North Korea as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to 
bolster internal political support for Kim Jong Un’s rule�
In recent years, South Korea has played a subtle and skillful diplomatic game, 
balancing the ROK-U�S� military alliance with the ROK-China strategic coopera-
tive partnership� The received wisdom is that continuing this strategy offers the 
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most plausible chance of ultimately resolving the tensions and threats arising 
from North Korea� But for the diplomatic track to succeed, it is essential to pre-
pare appropriate military options as well, both as a backup strategy and to focus 
minds and bring urgency to the diplomacy�
The ROKN should formulate a preemptive anti-exit strategy, acquire P-8s, 
build an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, 
and extend the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-exit strat-
egy� Other deterrence options could be considered, but surely it is significant that 
the ROKN for the first time recently referred publicly to the idea of deploying an 
ASW CV and SSNs�
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